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PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CRITICAL

ANALYSIS: KINK

. COMBS

By DAVID L. WALTHER,* AND THOMAS A. PLEIN**

In Kink v. Combs' the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed adherence to the doctrine of punitive damages.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the doctrine and inquire
into its historical and theoretical antecedents, with primary emphasis
on Wisconsin law.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Punitive damages has been known in the common law by name for
only two hundred years. 2 However, the use of private damages as
punishment is as old as man made law. The Mosaic law provided a
system of fines as damages. For example:
When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or sells it,
he shall restore five oxen for the one ox, and four sheep for
the one sheep.3
When men have a fight and hurt a pregnant woman, so that
she suffers a miscarriage, but no further injury, the guilty one
shall be fined as much as the woman's husband demands of
him, and he shall pay in the presence of the judges.4
By Plato's time, however, compensation was distinguished from
punishment.
When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the
law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the
like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must in addition pay for the hurt.5
Although the doctrine of punitive damages was unknown to the
Roman law6 and thus to the French civil law,7 in Anglo-American

common law jurisprudence punitive damages apparently developed
with the jury trial, although its development is somewhat obscure.
It has been argued that punitive damages were used as a means
* B.S., Marquette University (1958); LLB., Marquette University (1961); At-

torney at Law, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

**B.S., Wisconsin State College, Oshkosh (1963); candidate for LL.B. degree,

Marquette University (1966).
'Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W. 2d 789 (1965).
2 Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205 (K.B. 1763).
3 Exodus 21:37.
4 Exodus 21:22.
5
6 PLATO, The Laws IX page 606.
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1873); SEDGviciK Damages
§355 (1891). The Roman lex foria imposed an arbitrary penalty of four-fold
for the taking of excessive legacies, 3 POUND JIUmSPRUDENCE 345 (1952).
7Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 S. 541
(1917); Comment, 41 B.U.L. REv. 389 (1961).
9 C.J.S. Damages §117 (1941).
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of justifying excessive verdictsY Prior to the mid-seventeenth century,
jury determinations of damages were not reviewable by courts of
appeal.' 0 The writ of attaint was used to prevent a jury from deciding
a case perversely.1 If the jury were proven to have decided the question of liability or damages wrongly, the jurymen were subject to
punishment under the writ. Thus, a rule of law which could allow
damage verdicts to be conclusively presumed to be correct was a valuable adjunct to the jury system.
An exception to this rule developed in mayhem cases.' 2 In a mayhem
case the injuries of the plaintiff could be exhibited to the reviewing
court, which could thereby compare first hand the extent of the injuries with the size of the award. In 1655 an appellate court was the
first known court to set aside a verdict as excessive.13
However, courts were conservative and did not readily accept the
new power to set aside verdicts; they were anxious to find an excuse
to sustain the damage verdict. It has been argued that the concept of
4
punitive damages was born in the search for such an excuse.'
Some writers have said that the exemplary damage concept was
an outgrowth of the refusal of the law to recognize a cause of action
unless the plaintiff could fit his fact situation into the confines of one
of the original writs.1 The jury could give damages for the full injury
sustained if the plaintiff could get into court on the basis of a collateral
issue. Thus, substantial damages were awarded in early cases in
which the plaintiff suffered no apparent physical or financial loss from
the recognized wrong.'"
Other writers believe that punitive damages were conceived as a
"just compensation" for such intangibles as hurt feelings, wounded
dignity, and embarrassment." In the early history of the common law
these intangibles were not recognized as factors to consider in an
9 15 Am.

JUR. Damages §265 (1938); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages §236 (1965);
SEDGWIcx, Measure of Damages §§348-350 (9th ed. 1912).
10 Fay v. Parker supra note 6; SEDGWICK, Measure of Damages §§348-350 (9th

ed. 1912).
"'Roe v. Hawkes, 1 Lev. 97, 83 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1663).
12 Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q. REv. 345 at
356-357 (1931).
as Wood v. Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655).
'4 Hawkins v. Sciet (Palmer, 314), 81 Eng. Rep. 1099 (K.B. 1622).
15 Note 9 supra.
16 Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. Rep. 150, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1677);
Leith v. Pope, 2 Wm. Bl. 1327, 96 Eng. Rep. 777 (C.P. 1780).
"725 C.J.S. Damages §117 (1941); Hink v. Sherman, 164 Mich. 352, 129 N.W.
732 (1911) ; Will v. Hughes, 172 Kan. 45, 238 P. 2d 478, 486 (1951); Annot.,
16 A.L.R. 771 (1922) ; Fay v. Parker supra note 6; Cole, Can Damages Properly be Punitive, 6 JoHN MARSHALL L. Q. 477 (1941). Tulledge v. Wade,
3 Wils K. B. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 910 (C.P. 1769) where it said, "It is
greator insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange, than in a private
room."
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award of actual damages."" The theory that punitive damages are
"compensation" for the incompensable has remained the English justi9
fication for the doctrine in modem times.'
Another theory proposed as the basis of the doctrine of punitive
damages is that at early common law the criminal was punished more
severely for infractions involving property than for invasions of one's
personal rights, and that the civil courts took it upon themselves to
punish torts involving personal rights in order to strike a balance. 0
For whatever combination of reasons the doctrine of punitive
damages was developed in the common law. The doctrine had been
given its name in England by 1763.21
When the concept of punitive damages arrived in America in 1791,
the American courts abandoned the "compensation" theory, and recognized punitive damages as a means to castigate the defendant for his
malicious and cruel motives 22 With same exceptions, 23 the American
law has continued to offer "punishment" as the main purpose and
4
justification for the doctrine2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the doctrine in McWilliams
v. Braggf5 decided in 1854. In that case plaintiff sued for assault and
battery. The trial court instructed the jury that if the offense is committed willfully, the jury has the right to give damages as a punishment
for the purpose of making an example, and as a warning to him and
others.26 After an exhaustive consideration of the authorities pro and
con, the court held that exemplary or punitory damages might properly
be awarded.
We have selected and referred to the foregoing cases, out of a
large array of adjudications of similar import to be found in the
English reports, and we have done so for the purpose of showing, that in the English courts, the rule or measure of damages
Is Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1115, 1121 (1939) ; Fay v. Parker supra note 6.
19 McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages, 8 N.C.
L. Rxv. 129 at 132 where it is said that only in America have compensatory

damages been separated from punitives and only in America has the doctrine

been criticized; Cole, supra note 17.
Freefield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 Ohio ST. L. J. 5, 7 (1935).
21 Huckle v. Money supra note 2.
22 McCormick supra note 19 at page 132.
23 Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930); Wise v. Daniel, 221
Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Fay v. Parker supra note 6. Comment,
70 HARv. L. REv. 517 (1957).
2425 C.J.S. Damnages §117 (1941); Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Hohns, 155 Ky.
264, 159 S.W. 822, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 853 (1942); Pendleton v. Norfold & W. R.
Co. 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941, 16 A.L.R. 761 (1918) ; Lehner v. Berlin Pub.
Co. 211 Wis. 119, 246 N.W 579, 86 A.L.R. 1284 (1933); Luther v. Shaw,
157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 85 (1914) ; Brown v. Swineford,
44 Wis. 282. 28 Am. Rep. 582 (1878); Bielski v. Schultze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114
N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
20

253

Wis. 424 (1854).

26 Ibid.
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in actions for willful torts, and esepecially for personal injuries,
is not confined to mere compensation for the injury sustained
by the plaintiff, whether on his person or to his feelings, but
may extend to and embrace whatever the jury may consider a
suitable satisfaction as against the defendant, so as to operate
not only as an example, but to some extent as a punishment,
by passion
provided their decision or verdict be not influenced
27
or mere prejudice, and be not unreasonable.
The court then held:
We believe that the great weight of authority in the American
courts is in favor of permitting juries in actions of this character, not only to take into consideration the actual injury sustained by the plaintiff, but, where that injury is inflicted under
circumstances of aggravation, insult or cruelty, with vindictiveness and malice; but in view of all such circumstances, to impose what is sometimes termed exemplary, and sometimes punitory damages, in addition to the actual damages.2 . . . Our own
statute, in providing that actions for assault and battery, etc.,
shall survive, evidently contemplates the correctness of allowing
vindictive or exemplary damages in such cases, because it declares that the plaintiff shall not be entitled to such damages,
when the action is prosecuted to judgment against the executor
or administrator.2 9
ELEMENTS OF DOCTRINE

The Wisconsin court has held that compensatory damages covers
all loss recoverable as a matter of right.30 Pecuniary loss is an actual
damage; so is bodily pain and suffering.3 1
Nominal damages is a small sum of money awarded to a plaintiff
who has established a cause of action, by a complaint by which the
law presumes damage to exist, but where he has not proven that he
is entitled to compensatory damages.2
Exemplary damages are defined by Oleck as:
... damages awarded to a plaintiff over and above the amount
for his loss or injury, as a punishneeded to compensate him
33
ment to the defendant.
They are awarded to a plaintiff in order to punish a defendant for
27 Id. at 428-429.
2sId. at 431.
29 Ibid.
30 Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, 14 Wis. 2d 57, 66, 109 N.W. 2d 516 (1960);
GHIARDI, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN, §1.02 (Callaghan & Co.,

Current Law Series 1964).
31 Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
32 OLEcK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY §45 (1961) ; GHIARDI, op. cit. supra
note 30 at §1.06; Polebitzke v. John Week Lumber Co., 173 Wis. 509, 181
N.W. 730 (1921).
33 OLECK, op. cit. supra note 32, §29, citing Zedd v. Jenkins, 194 Va. 704, 74
S.E. 2d 791. Oleck lists 'presumptive damages,' 'vindictive damages,' 'smart
money' and 'added or imaginary damages' as synonyms for punitive damages.
See also Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612, 9 N.W. 599 (1881).
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his evil intent and maliciousness, 34 to make an example of him, and
35
to deter him and others from like conduct.
proper instructions of the court.36 They are not available as a matter
3
of right to any plaintiff. 7
Malice is a necessary element.3 As stated in McWilliams v. Bragg
34 Barber v. Kilbourn, 16 Wis. 511 (1863); Grace v. McArthur, 76 Wis. 641,
45 N.W. 518 (1890) ; Lamb v. Stone, 95 Wis. 254, 70 N.W. 72 (1897) ; Morse
v. Modern Woodmen of America, 166 Wis. 194, 164 N.W. 829 (1917); Delaney
v. Kaetel, 81 Wis. 353. 51 N.W. 559 (1892), Vassau v. The Madison Electric
R. Co., 106 Wis. 301, 82 N.W. 152 (1900); Mowry v. Wood, 12 Wis. 413
(1860); Rogers v. Henry, 32 Wis. 327 (1873); Wilson v. Noonan, 35 Wis.
321 (1874) ; Sorenson v. Dundas, 50 Wis. 335, 7 N.W. 259 (1880) ; Beveridge
v. Welch, 7 Wis. 394 (1859); Fuchs v. Kupper, 22 Wis. 2d 107, 125 N.W. 2d
360 (1963).
35
Klewin v. Bauman, 53 Wis. 244, 10 N.W. 398 (1881); Eviston v. Cramer,
57 Wis. 570, 15 N.W. 760 (1883); Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co.,
143 Wis. 52, 126 N.W. 554 (1910); Grace v. McArthur supra note 34; Malco
v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W. 2d 516 (1961); Glad36 felter v. Doemel, 2 Wis. 2d 635, 87 N.W. 2d 490 (1958).
Asplund v. Palmer, 258 Wis. 34, 44 N.W. 2d 624 (1950). The Court stated
at 258 Wis. 38-39 "While the allowance of exemplary damages has been a
much debated question, it is settled in this state that in actions for personal
torts 'a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of the offense, rather
than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff ....
This has always been
left to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus
inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case.' (Citations
omitted.) While the jury are not at liberty to award any amount, regardless
of how large it may be, and their verdict in some instances may be subject
to review by the court, it is considered that in this case there was no occasion
to disturb the finding of the jury, because the amount is not so large as to
satisfy the trial court or this court that it was not the result of an honest
exercise of judgment. Robubsib v. Superior Rapid Transit R. Co., 94 Wis.
345, 68 N.W. 961 (1896). Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis.
52, 126 N.W. 554 (1910). Haberman v. Gasser, 104 Wis. 98, 80 N.W. 105
'(1899); DiBenedetto v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. and Light Co., 149 Wis. 566,
136 N.W. 282 (1912) citing Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., .supra
note 35. See also, WIS. J.I.-CIvIL 1707 Where the approved jury instruction
on punitive damages is set forth as follows: "If you find from the evidence
that the defendant,
, (struck the plaintiff and that such
striking was not justified) and further find that the defendant acted maliciously, vindictively, wantonly, or under circumstances of aggravation or insult,
you may, if you see fit, but you are not obliged to do so, award, in addition
to compensatory damage, such sum as punitive damages as you may think
proper under the circumstances of the case, by way of example or punishment, in order to deter the defendant and others from offending in like
manner in the future. You may also consider the seriousness of the offense
committed, in reaching your answer.
"Punitive damages are never a matter or right, but, when allowable, may
be awarded or withheld in the discretion of the jury. Punitive damages may
not be awarded unless the acts of the defendant in question were done
maliciously, as I have explained malice to you, and, even if malicious, you
may withhold or allow them as you see fit." And if there is but one defendant
the following is added: "If you award punitive damages, you may consider
the defendant's wealth so far as it appears from the evidence, because such
damages, to accomplish their purpose, may be proportionate in some general
3 7 way to the defendant's ability to respond."
Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., supra note 35; Tilton v. Gates Land
Co., 140 Wis. 197, 14 N.W. 331 (1909); Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales
supra note 30; Vieth v. Dorsch, 274 Wis. 17, 79 N.W. 2d 96 (1956).
3 Johannson v. Borchenisu, 35 Wis. 131 (1874); Prindle v. Haight, 83 Wis.
50, 52 N.W. 1134 (1892) ; Born v. Rosenow, 84 Wis. 620, 54 N.W. 1089 (1893) ;
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the injury to the plaintiff must have been sustained "under circumstances of aggravation, insult or cruelty, with vindictiveness and
malice."3 9 The requisite malice may be inferred from the conduct of
the defendant40 but it may not be implied in law,4' except for cases of
Punitive damages are solely in the discretion of the jury upon
malicious prosecution, where actual maliciousness is an element of the
42
particular tort.
Actual malice also need not be shown where defendant has acted
in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights, 43 or where his conduct is
intentional and deliberate and has the character of outrage frequently
associated with crime. 44 Thus actual malice need not be shown for
45
punitive damages in a seduction action.
In Bielski v. Schulze4 6 the Wisconsin court abolished the concept
of gross negligence in civil actions. Because gross negligence involved
a willful and wanton disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, one could
argue that since the concept of gross negligence has been abolished,
punitive damages can no longer be recovered in negligence cases. In
the Bielski decision the Court used language to this effect. 47 Although
the court set forth the classic argument against punitive damages
therein,'4 it is unlikely that the court intended to restrict punitive damages to intentional torts exclusively. It is likely that punitive damages
are still available in negligence cases where defendant's conduct was
willful and wanton.
If the pleading alleges malice, evidence will be admitted to show
it as a fact. 49 The defendant may introduce evidence of his good faith
and general absence of malice. 50
Kloth v. Hess,
Electric R. Co.
390 3 Wis. 424, 431
4 Ghiardi, op. cit.

126 Wis. 587, 106 N.W. 251 (1906) ; Vassau v. The Madison
suepra note 34.
(1854).
supra note 32, §2.04 page 12.

4'Id. at §2.02 page 10.
42 Ibid.

The Ride of Exemplary Damages in Wisconsin, 2 Wis. L. REV.
129 (1923).
44Kink v. Combs, supra note 1.
S5Klopfer v. Bromine, 26 Wis. 372, 374 (1870) ; Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234,
147 N.W. 18 (1914).
4616 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
47 Id. at page 18 where the court says, "We recognize the abolition of gross
negligence does away with the basis for punitive damages in negligence cases.
But punitive damages are given, not to compensate the plaintiff for his injury,
but to punish and deter the tortfeasor, and were acquired by gross negligence
as accoutrements of intentional torts."
48Ibid. "The protection of the public from such conduct or from reckless, wanton, or wilful conduct is best served by the criminal laws of the state."
49Vassau v. The Madison Electric R. Co., 106 Wis. 301, 305, 82 N.W. 152
(1900). Compare: Grisim v. Milwaukee City Ry. Co., 84 Wis. 19, 54 N.W.
104 (1893) where the plaintiff was not allowed to offer evidence of malice
because only compensatory damages were sought. See also, Lowe v. Ring,
123 Wis. 107, 101 N.W. 381 (1904).
591n Prindle v. Haight, 83 Wis. 50, 52, 52 N.W. 1134 (1892) the court held,
43 Wickham,
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Mitigating circumstances may be shown by the defendant to diminish the punitory damage award.51 In Maxwell v. Kennedy the court
.said:
Punitive damages are the last to be assessed in the elements to
be considered by a jury,
53 and should be the first to be rejected
by facts in mitigation.
The bad reputation of the plaintiff has been held to be a mitigating
factor to be considered by the jury in deciding whether to award exemplary damages.5 4 Intoxication at the time the defendant perpetrates
the wrongful act is a mitigating factor to be considered by the jury
in awarding punitive damages if the intoxication in any manner deprives the defendant of his reason or responsibility. 5 If the intoxication does not deprive the defendant of his reseponsibility, the intoxication is probably an aggravating, rather than a mitigating factor.
Because the purpose of punitive damages is punishment, 56 evidence
will be received relating to the wealth 7 or poverty 8 of the defendant.
The evidence of wealth, however, is not binding on the jury, but merely
a circumstance for them to consider in their decision.59
"If the assault was malicious, the jury may award exemplary damages. Hence
defendant must be allowed to allege and prove any facts which tend to
rebute the existence of malice on his part. Proof that he committed the assault
under stress of recent provocation would tend to rebut malice." Scheer v.
Kriesel, 109 Wis. 125, 128, 85 N.W. 138 (1901); Hamlin v. Spaulding, 27
Wis. 360, 363, 364 (1870).
51 Schultz v. Frankfort, 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913) a slander action
holding evidence in mitigation may be admitted but mitigation is not a
defense to the action. Corcoran v. Harran, 55 Wis. 120, 122, 12 N.W. 468
(1882) citing Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344, 10 N.W. 501 (1881), to the
effect that proof of defendant's good faith is admissible to mitigate punitory
damages but it cannot be considered to mitigate compensatory damages,
including those allowed for injury to the feelings. Bonesteel v. Bonesteel,
30 Wis. 511 (1872) a false imprisonment action, held that erroneous advice
of counsel ought to save from all presumptions of malice. See also, Rogers
v. Henry, 32 Wis. 327 (1873) a slander action, where the words were uttered
without malice, but in the heat of the moment and provoked by the plaintiff
who had used abusive language as well.

52 50 Wis. 645, 7 N.W. 657 (1880).
53 Id. at 649.

54Supra note 52; Schultz v. Frankfort, 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913).
55 Schmidt v. Pfeil, 24 Wis. 452 (1869).
56 See note 24 supra.
5 Thomas v. Williams, 139 Wis. 467, 121 N.W. 148 (1909); Gilman v. Brown,
115 Wis. 1, 91 N.W. 227 (1902); Spear v. Sweeney, 88 Wis. 545, 60 N.W.
1060 (1894); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884); Meibus v.
Dodge, 38 Wis. 300, 20 Am. Rep. 6 (1875).
58 Draper v. Baker supra note 57, where the court stated at 61 Wis. 453, 454,
"But the case does not decide that the plaintiff may not in such case show
the reputed wealth of the defendant to enhance the exemplary damages;
but it does hold that when no evidence is given on the subject, and, impliedly, that when such evidence is given, the defendant may answer it by
showing his real financial condition."
59 Ogodziski v. Gara, 173 Wis. 371, 181 N.W. 227; 173 Wis. 380, 181 N.W.
231 (1921); Thomas v. Williams supra note 60 where the supreme court
held at 139 Wis. 470, "The proper form of expression is that the jury may
consider the defendant's wealth so far as appears from the evidence in a
case otherwise proper for allowance of exemplary damages."
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However, the reputed wealth of a defendant will not be admitted
into evidence where there are joint tortfeasors. 60 In such instance the
financial ability of one defendant would affect the amount of punitory
damages assessed againt all,"' because all joint tortfeasors are equally
liable.62
Even in a case involving maliciousness on the part of a very rich
defendant, the jury may award little or no punitive damages.63 An
appellate tribunal will not reverse on the ground that the defendant
was not sufficiently punished. 64 In the absence of passion or prejudice
the punitive damage award is left to the sole discretion of the jury.65
Even though the defendant may be fined in criminal proceedings, 6 or
have punitive damages awarded against him in another action involving
the same tortious conduct 6 7 he may be punished further by an award
of exemplary damages.
Malice does not create a cause of action where none existed but
merely aggravates an existing cause of action." Some actual damages
must be shown in order for punitive damages to be given. 69 Where
60McAllister v. Kimberly Clark Co., 169 Wis. 473, 173 N.W. 216

(1919);
Ogodziski v. Gara, supra note 59; Lehner v. Berlin Pub. Co., 211 Wis. 119,
246 N.W. 579 (1933); see also White v. White, 140 Wis. 538, 122 N.W.

1051 (1909).

61 See cases cited note 59 supra.
62

Kropidlowski v. Pfister & Vogel Leather Co., 149 Wis. 421, 135 N.W. 839,

39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 509 (1912); Folsom v. Apple River Log Driving Co., 41

Wis. 602 (1877); But see, Bosin v. Minneapolis St. P. & S.S.M.R. Co., 183
F. Supp. 820, aff'd 297 F. 2d 583 (1960) ; Geiger v. Calumet County, 18 Wis.
2d 151, 118 N.W. 2d 197 (1962).

63 See notes 35 and 36 supra.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.

66Klopfer v. Bromine, 26 Wis. 372 (1870), where the court said at page 377,
"That the defendant might possibly be prosecuted criminally for the seduction,
or for procuring the abortion, was not a matter which the jury were to consider for the purpose of reducing exemplary damages. In Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill
466, the court, in considering this question, says: 'Nor are we prepared to

concede that either a fine, an imprisonment, or both, should be received in

evidence to mitigate damages.' If a fine actually imposed, or imprisonment
really endured, are not admissible in evidence to reduce exemplary damages
in a civil action, it is obvious that the fact that a party is barely liable to
punishment in this manner ought not to be considered by the jury for any
such purpose."
67 Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914).
6s Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 56, 147 N.W. 32 (1914).
69 OLECK, op. cit. supra note 32, §45 page 31 where it is said, "'Nominal damages'
are any trifling amount of money awarded to a party in recognition of the
technical correctness of his claim. Usually such an award is made when no
real injury can be proved, or when the amount of such injury is insignificant,
or purely conjectural and vague." See also, Maxwell v. Kennedy, 50 Wis.
645, 649, 7 N.W. 657, 658 (1880) quoting Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me.,
279 to have said, 'There is no room for punitive damages here. There is no
foundation for them to attach or rest upon. It is said, in vindication of the
theory of punitive damages, that the interests of the individual injured and
society are blended. Here the interests of society have virtually nothing to
blend with. If the individual has but a nominal interest, society can have
none. Such damages are to be awarded against a defendant for punishment.
But, if all of the individual injury is merely technical and theoretical, what
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mere nominal damages have been awarded, the injury is only technical
and theoretical; as the defendant has caused no actual harm he should
70

not be punished.

It is difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether the jury
has assessed the proper sum as punitive damages. In a number of
jurisdictions there must be a positive correlation between the amount
of the actual damages and punitives.71
At an early date the Wisconsin court held:
...[T]he compensatory and punitive damages are inseparably
blended, and the punitive damages are dependent upon the
compensatory, anti must be proportional, and mitigation applies
equally to both. 2
This rule is restricted to cases of slander, where proof of
bad character or reputation bears directly, both on malice, and the
74
extent of the injury.73 However, in Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales
the court held that an award of punitory damages is tested against the
75
Powers rule of reasonableness.
In Wisconsin, a principal is not liable for exemplary, damages
awarded because of the maliciousness of his employee, unless the
tortious act is authorized or ratified by the principal, or the principal
has conspired to cause the harm.' Other jurisdictions have reached an
opposite result.

77

The majority of American states apply the doctrine of punitive
is the punishment to be inflicted for? If a plaintiff, upon all such elements
of injury as were open to him, is entitled to recover but nominal damages,
shall he be the recipient of penalties awarded on account of an injury, or
supposed injury, to others besides himself? If there was enough in the defense to mitigate the damages to the individual, so did it mitigate the damages
to the public as well. . .

."

See also, Barnard v. Cohen, 165 Wis. 417, 162

N.W. 480 (1917); Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 117 N.W. 2d 275
(1962).
70 Maxwell v. Kennedy supra note 69.
71 OLECIC, supra note 32, §275 page 560, where it is said, "Most courts require
that the punitive award bear some reasonable relation to the actual award;
and some relate it to the circumstances and the injury." See also, Annot.,
7 17 A.L.R. 2d 529, (1951).
Maxwell v. Kennedy, supra note 69.
73 Ibid.; Ghiardi, op. cit. supra note 32, §2.14 page 24.
7
4Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W. 2d 516 (1961).
75 Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W. 2d 393 (1960).
76 Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657 (1875); Milwaukee & M.R.
Co. v. Jinney 10 Wis. 388 (1860); Vanau v. The Madison Electric Ry. Co.,
106 Wis. 301, 82 N.W .152 (1900); Garcia v. Samson's Inc., 10 Wis. 2d 515,

103 N.W. 2d 565 (1960).

7 Medlin v. Southern R. Co., 143 S.C. 91, 141 S.E. 185, 56 A.L.R. 767 (1928);
Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W. 2d 293, 3 A.L.R. 2d 203 (1948);
Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P. 2d
281 (1948); Annot, 89 A.L.R. 358. See also Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v.
Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 71 L. ed. 952, 47 S. Ct. 509, 51 A.L.R. 1376 (1927),
where the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a statute (Homicide Act of Alabama §5696 (1923), which has been interpreted by the state
courts to allow punitive damages to be assessed against a principal without
fault, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 183 (1961).
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damages in appropriate cases, 78 although the rules which govern punitive damages vary from state to state.7 9 Louisiana,80 Massachusetts,,"
Nebraska,8 2 and Washington 3 have expressly rejected the doctrine.
Indiana awards punitory damages only where there is no possibility
that the defendant might be punished under the criminal law."8 Those
states which have rejected the common law doctrine of punitive damages, however, still apply statutory multiple damages under many circumstances.8 5
In many jurisdictions punitive damages are beyond the powers of
an equity court.8 ' The reasoning is that an equity court may use its
special powers only to aid the plaintiff in obtainirng justice.
Although most states offer punishment as the foundation for punitive damages, some jurisdictions justify punitive damages on a theory
of quasi-compensation. 7 In Connecticut, exemplary damages may not
be greater than the amount of the plaintiffs litigation expenses.,
Michigan and New Hampshire allow plaintiff to recover exemplary
damages for his wounded feelings.8 9
Most jurisdictions do not apply the doctrine to contract cases, unless
the breach also amounts to a tort.90
Although many jurisdictions award punitive damages where the
defendant has been grossly negligent,9 1 in Colorado mere recklessness is
sufficient. 92 Colorado originally rejected the doctrine of punitive dam78 OLECK, op cit. supra note 32 §269 page 541.
9 Ibid. Mr. Oleck provides a list of variations in the doctrine of punitive damages as found in a number of jurisdictions.
80 Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 S. 541
(1917).

81
O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D.S. Mass. 1940).
82
Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881).
s3Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 P. 774 (1915).
84
Murphy Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coomer, 123 Ind. App. 112 N.E. 2d 589, (1953);
Skufakiss v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426, 154 N.E. 289 (1926).

85 REV. CODE WASH. §59.12.170 (double damages allowed in unlawful detainer);

REV. CODE WASH. §19.44.050 (double damages for waste.); Anno. Mass. L.
1932, Chap. 221, §51 (multiple damages allowed for willful damage to trees).
REv. ST. NEBI. 1943, §§44-359, 381.
86 Dunkel v. McDonald, 272 App. Div. 267, affd., 289 N.Y. 586, 81 N.E. 2d

323 (1948). But see I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park So. Corp. 228 N.Y.S. 2d
833 and 63 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1963).
87Louisville & N.R.R. v. Gilliam's Admin., 24 Ky. L. R. 1536, 71 S.W. 863

(1903); Hanna v. Sweeney, 78 Conn. 492, 62 A. 785 (1906).

88 Armstrong v. Dodge, 130 Conn. 516, 26 A. 2d 24 (1944) ; Doroszka v. Lavine,

111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930).
89 McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Danmages, 8 N.C.
L. REV. 129, 133 (1929).

OLECI, op. cit. supra note 32 §270 at 543-544. But see, Comment 10 S.C. L. Q.
444 (1958) and 13 VAND. L. REV. 390 (1959) and 20 INs. L. J. 20 (1955).
91 Gill v. Selling, 125 Or. 587, 126 Or. 584, 267 P. 812, 270 P. 411, 58 A.L.R.
1556 (1928); Quinn v. South Carolina R. Co., 29 S.C. 281, 7 S.E. 614, 1
L.R-A. 682 (1888); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Pope, 175 Miss. 393, 166 S. 539
(1936) ; Annot. 31 A.L.R. 1362 (1924) ; Annot. 104 AL.R. 412 (1936) ; Annot.
62 A.L.R. 2d 816 (1958); 15 Am. JUR Damnages §281 (1938); 23 AM. JUR.
2d Damages §251 (1965).
92 COLO. REV. ST. ANN. §41-2-2; Comment 3 U. COLO. L. REV. 394 (1963).
90
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Punitive damages have been the subject of constant debate since the
concept was first developed. The Greenleaf-Sedgwick disagreement
concerning the function of damages is probably the most famous, and
is noted in the Wisconsin decision of McWilliams v. Bragg.94 Sedgwick
argued that:
Whenever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or
oppression mingle in the controversy, the law, instead of adhering to the system or even the language of compensation,
adopts a wholly different rule. It permits the jury to give what
it terms punitory, vindictive, or exemplary damages; in other
words, blends together the interest of society and the aggrieved
only to recompense the sufindividual, and gives damages not
95
ferer but to punish the offender.
We know it is constantly said, in general, that damages are intended for compensation; very loose language, at the best, for
no verdict ever compensated for the entire injury; but has it
ever been decided or suggested, by any judge of any court, that
by way of
a jury cannot, in actions ex delicto, give damages
9
punishment beyond the line of compensation ?
Sedgwick claimed that a clear and complete distinction could not be
made between injuries to the public and to individuals, but that the
interests are blended inseparably. 97 Sedgwick took issue with the strict
compensation theory of damages, and claimed there could be no standard of measuring damages that would be as strict as the rule.98 Sedgwick questioned how the jury could determine the exact amount of
compensation, ".... the pound of flesh and not a drop of blood. .. ,9
"As to damages being campensation, the sooner the idea is got out of
the head of a practical lawyer the better ... 100
Professor Greenleaf argued that the theory of punitory damages
was a misconception. He was of the opinion that Sedgwick's case
analysis and conclusions were erroneous. 101 Greenleaf reviewed each
93 Colo. Laws 1889 at 64: CoLo. REV. STATS. ANN. §41-2-2: "In all civil actions
in which damages shall be assessed by a jury for a wrong done to the person, or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of shall have
been attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and
reckless disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings, such jury, in
addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, may award him
reasonable exemplary damages."
94 3 Wis. 424 1854).
95 SEDGWICK, Damages, app. 666 (3d ed. 1858).
96 Id. at 670.
97 Id. at 670-671.
98

Id. at 671.

99 Ibid.

'00 Id. at 672.

10, 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENcE §253 footnote 2 page 244 (3d ed. 1850).
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of the early cases, claimed by Sedgwick to support the doctrine of
punitory damages, and argued that the doctrine was never really accepted on its merits. x° Greenleaf argued that the doctrine of punitive
damages was merely an evidentiary rule that the jury could be allowed
to consider all the relevant circumstances of the case in determining
compensatory damages. Greenleaf argued that the willingness of the
courts to allow the jury to weigh mental suffering, wounded dignity
and injured feelings of the plaintiff, in order to determine the actual
injury, was misinterpreted by Sedgwick as the punitive damage doctrine. 0 3 Professor Greenleaf used the very language of the decisions
cited by Sedgwick to bolster his position:
But in Tillotson v. Cheetham, the learned Chief Justice, in saying that the actual pecuniary damages in actions for tort, are
never the sole rule of assessment, probably meant no more than
this, that the jury were at liberty to consider all the damages
accruing to the plaintiff from the wrong done, without being
confined 1°4
to those which are susceptible of arithmetical computation.

In Woert z. Jenkins, 14 Johns. 352, which was trespass, for
beating the plaintiff's horse to death, with circumstances of
great barbarity, the Jury were told that they 'had a right to give
smart money;' by which nothing more seems to have been meant
than that they might take into consideration the circumstance
of the cruel act, as enhancing the injury to the plaintiff by the
laceration of his feelings. 05
It was Greenleaf's thought that a function of compensatory damages
was punishment but that damages awarded solely for the purpose of
punishing the defendant was without precedent. Professor Greenleaf
06
Dr. Rutherford, 07 and Mr. Hammond 108
marshalled Blackstone,
for support in his argument in favor of a strict compensatory theory
of damages.
Arguments have been advanced in favor and against the doctrine
in every state, and nearly every state has accepted the concept of exemplary damages to some degree. 09
102 Id. at 245-253.
103 Id. at 247.
104 Id. at 246.
105 Ibid.
10 Id.
1071 d.

at 253, citing 2 BI. Comm. 438.

at 253 citing

RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAWS §1 at 385 (Phil.
edit. 1799).
108 Id. at 253 citing HAMMOND, LAW OF Nisi PRius, p. 33.
109 Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 (1888) where the court criticises
the doctrine of punitive damages in a thorough and scholarly decision which
takes note of the Sedgwick-Greenleaf debate. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo.
541, 5 Pac. 119, 122 (1884) where the court says, "Who will undertake to
give a valid reason why plaintiff, after having fully paid for all the injury
inflicted upon his property, body, reputation, and feelings, should still be
compensated, above and beyond, for a wrong committed against the public
at large? The idea is inconsistent with sound legal principles, and should

1965]
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At one time compensation was used as the main theoretical justification for the doctrine. 10 This theory is seldom offered to justify the
doctrine today,"1. and expressly recognized as the theoretical basis in
only a few jurisdictions.1" This theory does have merit. There are
injuries even today for which there is no redress in the law." 3 If joined
with a legally cognizable cause of action for which punitive damages
are available, punitive damages may be awarded by a jury in consideration of all the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, not merely those
which are compensable in law.
Interestingly, plaintiffs often plead punitive damage liability, to
make admissible evidence of defendant's malice, or wanton and willful
state of mind, and defendant's wealth, in the hope that such evidence
will improve compensatory damages.
Further, punitive damages give the plaintiff compensation for his
litigation expenses." 14 In this sense punitive damages perform a compensatory function, even though the Wisconsin court has defined
never have found a lodgment in the law." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 at
page 382 (1873) where the court describes the doctrine of punitive damages
in the following words, "How could the idea of punishment be deliberately
and designedly installed as a doctrine of civil remedies? Is not punishment
out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to
say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies? What kind
of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant? The
idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of'the body of the law." Brown
v. Swineford 44 Wis. 282 at 286-288 (1878) the court says, "It certainly
appears to be an incongruity, that one may be punished by the public for
crime, upon criminal prosecution, by fine limited by statute, and again
punished in favor of the sufferer, but in right of the public, for the same
act, by punitory damages, with little limit but the discretion of a jury.
This is but another illustration of what appears to be the incongruity of the
entire rule of exemplary damages. . . .It would have been no subject of
regret to the court, if the obligation of the constitution called upon it to
abridge the application of the rule. But the court is unable to hold that the
constitutional provision has any controlling bearing on the question ...
But the rule so long and so generally established is a sin against sound
judicial principle, not against the constitutional." Cays v. McDaniel, 204 Or.
449, 383 P. 2d 658, 661 (1955) where the court says, "Punitive damages are
not a favorite of the law."
310 Cole supra note 17.
11 Comment, 70 HARV. L. Ray. 517, 521 (1957).
1-Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 Atl. 692 (1930); Wise v. Daniel,
221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
in 87 C.J.S. Trademarks §107 (1954) "One cannot, by using his own name as
a trademark or trade-name, prevent another person of the same or similar
name from using his own name in connection with his goods or business.
• ..The necessary and incidental inconvenience or loss thereby occasioned
to others is damnum absque injuria .
where the court
114 Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 At]. 692-693 (1930)
said, ". . . in this state the purpose is not to punish the defendant for his
offense but to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries, and so-called punitive
or exemplary damages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff's expenses
of litigation, less taxable costs." Kink v. Combs, supra note 1 at p. 80, 135
N.W. 2d at 798; 25 C.J.S. Damages §50 (1941).
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punitive damages as damages over and above that which compensates
the plaintiff for his injuries. 15
Punishment is used most often to justify the doctrine of punitory
damages.", The concept of punishment in the law, of course, is an
ancient concept. The function of punishment has changed constantly
through the centuries, however, with the civilization of man, from
sadism, revenge, justice, atonement, purification, discipline, deterrence,
example, and reformation.
Punishment is well established in the criminal law. The objective
of criminal law is to protect society. The objective of the civil law,
however, has been indemnification of the complainant. 1 7 The device
used to accomplish this end is damages. Consistently, therefore, the
function of damages in civil law should be to make the injured party
whole,"" not to confer upon him a profit at the expense of punishment
to the defndant.
In Kink v. Combs" 9 the Wisconsin supreme court recognized that
this "profit motive" could serve the interests of society by
...bringing to punishment types of conduct that though oppressive and hurtful to the individual almost invariably go unpunished by the public prosecutor 20
The court noted that the criminal law seldom reaches an assault and
battery case, and that self-interest of the plaintiff leads to the prosecution of the defendant.
It would seem, however, that if the criminal law has been deficient
in the protection of society from wrongdoers, that this deficiency should
more rationally be remedied by improving the administration of criminal
justice, rather than providing bounties at the expense of the tortfeasor.121
It has been argued that the law has recognized man's vengeful
propensities, and allows punitive damages to prevent self-help. The
solution the French law has worked out for this problem is to allow
criminal penalties to be assessed in addition to an award of compensatory damages," 2 where the civil litigant brings the defendant to trial.
5 Oconto County v. Union Mfg., 190 Wis. 44, 208 N.W. 989 (1926);
v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am.Rep. 582 (1878).

116 1

SaREEr, FOUNDATIONS
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(1926);

Malco

Brown
Midwest

Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W. 2d 516 (1961); Gladfelter v.
Doemel, 2 Wis. 2d 635, 87 N.W. 490 (1958); 25 C.J.S. Damages §117 (1941).
117 WILLIS, DAMAGES §6 (1910). See cases cited supra note 109.
I's Ibid. But see Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUm. L.
REV. 753, 967 (1943) for an outstanding comparative analysis of the function
of the civil and criminal law.
1"9 Supra note 1.
12o Id. at 80, 135 N.W. 2d 798.
121 Comment, 7 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521 (1957). See also 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE

245 (1952).
12Id. at 522-523; Millar, Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 9 JOUR. AM.
JUD. Soc. 135 (1926).
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Deterrence provides a meaningful reason for punishing a tortfeasor
where the punishment bears a reasonable relationship to the culpability
of the defendants. The necessary element of malice in a punitive damage case insures that the defendant must be culpable or punitory
damages could not be awarded. Often, however, the amount of punishment is not correlated with the amount of culpability exhibited. In
most jurisdictions an award of actual damages is necessary to sustain
a punitory award.12 3 In some states the amount of exemplary damages
must bear some relation to the amount of compensatory damages
awarded.2 4 Thus, punitive damages are often tied to the harm inflicted, rather than the evil of the wrongdoer.
Whether a civil court should have the power to punish defendants
is another difficult jurisprudential question.
It has long been recognized by jurisprudents that the fields of torts
and crimes are closely related. 2 5 Criminal and tort law have the negative common denominator that both involve noncontractual or nonconsensual wrongs. Many of the general rules and remedies are common to both fields, as well. 2 6 The fields of criminal law and torts
might be considered as areas branching from the broader concept of
' 21 7
actionability resting upon "moral culpability.
However, there is a substantial distinction between the two fields,
viewed from the position of the party injured. A crime is a wrong
committed against society.m' A tort is a wrong perpetrated solely upon
an individual or a group smaller than society. 29 To be a tortfeasor
one must injure someone to his damage. To be a criminal there need
be no actual injury or damage but merely an act deemed contrary to
the interests of the public. To carry a concealed weapon is a crime,
but not a tort. A single act, of course, may be both a crime and a tort,
and thus make the actor both a criminal and a tortfeasor.
Blackstone" ° asserted that crimes are a violation of public law and
torts of private law. Crimes infringe public rights, torts infringe private
rights. Crimes affect the public as a whole; torts are individual and are
not the concern of the public. The function of the criminal law is to
punish and deter. The function of the civil forum is to compensate.
Austin rejected Blackstone's reasoning and asserted that "All offenses
C.J.S. Damages §118 (1941); Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 117
N.W. 2d 275 (1962). But see 3 BAYLOR L. Ray. 591 (1951) and 23 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 206 (1950).
124 Annot. 17 A.L.R. 2d 529 (1951); OLECK op. cit. supra note 32 §275.
125 Hall, supra note 118.
2
1 6 PROSSER, TORTS §2 page 7 (1964).
127 Hall supra note 118 at 755-759.
28
2
PmKINS, CiMiNA. LAW §1 (1957).
129 PROSSER, op. cit., supra note 126.
130 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs, Bk III, 2; Bk. IV, 5.
12325
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affect the community, and all offenses affect individuals."' '31 Austin
argued that the community has an interest in protecting the individual
2
from the tortfeasor."
Those jurisdictions that have accepted the doctrine of punitive damages have not followed the deterrence theory with consistency. The
civil courts have assumed the right to punish defendants, but have not
recognized a corresponding duty to do so. Whether to award such damages is a question left to the jury, and its decision is conclusively correct, and no appeal may be had on the ground that punitives should
33
have been awarded but were not.
Even if a civil court should take money from the defendant to
punish him, why should it award money to the plaintiff ?134
It has been argued that punitive damages provide double punishment for the same offense, and thus the rule against double jeopardy
is violated. Indiana will not allow a defendant to be punished civilly
if he is likely to be sanctioned by the criminal law."35 It has been argued
that even in the absence of a violation of the double jeopardy rule, the
sum of the punishment inflicted may be in excess of what is needed
to deter the defendant from committing further antisocial acts, or to
rehabilitate him. 36 The sentencing judge in the criminal court, however, is not allowed to consider the punishment inflicted by means of
punitive damages and the civil jury may not be told that the defendant
1 7
is, or may be prosecuted criminally for the same offense.
If the civil court is empowered to punish a defendant for his malice,
a good argument can be made for increasing the plaintiff's burden of
proof so that it more nearly corresponds with that required in the
criminal courts."3
In the landmark case of Fay v. Parker 39 the court stated:
Punitive damages are the result of "[I]nstructions prompted by
impulses of righteous indignation, swift to administer supposed
justice to a guilty defendant, but expressed with too little caution
and without pausing to reflect that the court was thus encouraging the jury to give the plaintiff more than he was entitled to,to give him, in fact, as damages the avails of a fine imposed for
'13AusTiN, LEcruREs oN JURISPRUDENcE

Ibid.

417 (4th ed. 1879).
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v. Gates Land Co., 140 Wis. 197, 14 N.W. 331 (1909); Robinson v.
Superior Rapid Transit R. Co., 94 Wis. 345, 68 N.W. 961 (1896); Asplund
v. Palmer, 258 Wis. 34, 44 N.W. 2d 624 (1950).
134Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1931).
"35Taber
v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854); McClellan, Exemplary Damages in
Indiana, 10 IND. L. J. 275 (1935). See also 3 KAN. L. J .369 (1900); and
21 NomE DAME LAw 206 (1946).
136 Cole, supra note 17; Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1872).
Comment, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 524, 525 (1957).
37 25 C.J.S. Damages §122 (1941) ; Klopfer v. Bromine, 26 Wis. 372 (1870).
138 VrnLis, DAMAGES § (1910).
139 Fay v. Parker supra note 136.
133Tilton
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the vindication
of the criminal law, and for the sake of public
0
example."'14
Our own court has used similar language. 14 1 In Brown v. Swineford'4 the court stated:
It would have been no subject of regret to the court, if the obligation of the constitution called upon it to abridge the application
of the rule . . .143
It is unfortunate that damage should ever have been suffered to
go beyond actual compensation, under a liberal rule like that
given in Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657. But the rule so
long and so generally established is a sin against sound judicial
principle, not against the constitution.'"
Again, in Luther v.Shaw, '4 the court stated:
From the doctrinaire viewpoint and assuming as premises that
damages should never exceed compensation and that every mulct
imposed as a punishment or deterrent should go into the public
treasury, the award of such damages to the plaintiff in a private
prosecution would seem to be illogical.
Speaking for myself only in this paragraph, I am inclined to
admit that, assuming these premises, the lack of logic is quite
apparent. But it is a commonplace observation that illogical
systems of government often achieve better results than those
which are strictly logical. The law giving exemplary damages is
an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law.
It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instrument of government, discourages private reprisals, restrains the strong influential and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak,
and encourages recourse to and confidence in the courts of law
by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable
in or not sufficiently punished by the criminal law. The latter law
must be uniform as to persons and acts, must fix a maximum and
minimum punishment oji this basis, and cannot always be adjusted to particular circumstances of atrocity which occasionally
occur. The maximum penalty, together with compensatory damages for the wrongful taking of one little ewe lamb, would be
quite inadequate and unsatisfactory in the hypothetical case put
by Nathan to David. If some American multimillionaire should
emulate the antics of Lucius Veratius with reference to personal
or property rights, justice might require some deterrent not found
Id. at 381.
' Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 126 N.W. 554 (1910);
Templeton v. Graves, 59 Wis. 95, 17 N.W. 672 (1883) where the court said
Citing Bass v. C. & N.W.R. Co., 42 Wis. 654 (1877) that it was too late
to overturn the doctrine of punitive damages by judicial decision and that
opponents of the doctrine would have to await a legislative enactment to
effect its aboltion.
142 Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582 (1878).
243 Id. at 286-287.
1244Id. at 288.
145 Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18, 52 N.R.A. (N.S.) 85 (1914).
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in the criminal-law penalties plus compensatory damages. The
ordinary case of aggravated newspaper libel where the actual
damages are small, or in case of malicious
abuse of legal process,
1 46
will supply more modern instances.

CONCLUSION

In Kink v. Combs 147 the defendant urged the court to abandon the
doctrine of punitive damages. The facts in that case were not particularly calculated to persuade the court that the doctrine should be
abandoned. In that case the defendant who was the owner of a well
known Madison and Milwaukee restaurant, sexually assaulted the
plaintiff, a middle aged married woman, in a public restaurant.
The court reaffirmed the doctrine of punitive damages. Unfortunately, the facts of the case obscured the flaws in the logic of the doctrine. However, logic is not the sole criterion of the value of a legal
concept. Punitive damages do provide rough compensation for the
costs of litigation, and facilitate the adjudication of controversies which
otherwise would be uneconomical to bring into court.
Bass v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 148 was tried three times, before different juries in different counties. Twice punitive damages were given and
once the award was solely compensatory. The total damage figure was
the same in all three cases. If it makes no difference to a jury whether
it is instructed on punitive damages or not, perhaps the law should
not be unduly concerned with the logical structure of the doctrine. Although the courts have rejected Professor Greenleaf's argument, the
practical operation of the doctrine before juries have borne out his
analysis.

146Id. at 238-239.

147Supra note 1.

148 Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 39 Wis. 636 (1876).

